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Summary
This document describes the Access Control Model realized for the novel Pepys dis-
tributed, Internet-wide, ﬁle-system. The model design has been widely inspired to
various existing standards and best practices about access control and security in ﬁle-
system access, but it also echoes peculiar basic principles characterizing the design of
Pepys, as well as the ΠP protocol, over which Pepys itself relies.
The proposed model is based of few cardinal points, which makes it particularly
suitable for ﬁle-systems in which a consistently number of users wants (or has to)
share its own data.
Particularly our model aims to create an environment where the following goals
are satisﬁed:
• users can set their own rules for their data,
• the system administrator has to be able to set upper-bound rules in which every
user has to obey,
• users can form real communities, sharing so their data and the rules applied to
it,
• users can delegate other users in order to perform a given action on their behalf.
This document also provides technical details about how the model has been realized
on a Linux port of Pepys.
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Part I
Introduction
In computing, a distributed ﬁle-system (or network ﬁle-system) is any ﬁle-system that
allows access to its objects (ﬁles and directories) from multiple hosts sharing via a
computer network. This makes it possible for multiple users on multiple machines to
share ﬁles and storage resources.
In a conventional ﬁle-system, is understood where the ﬁle actually resides; since
the system and disk are known. In a distributed ﬁle-system, the location of a ﬁle,
somewhere in the network, is hidden from the user point of view. Files in this type
of ﬁle-systems are stored in remote ﬁle-servers.
Distributed ﬁle-systems may include facilities for ﬁle replication and fault tol-
erance. That is, if a limited number of nodes in the ﬁle-system crash, the system
continues to work properly. File replication means that a ﬁle (or a ﬁle-system object
in general) is replicated in more diﬀerent servers; this fact aﬀects positively perfor-
mances and ﬁles availability.
Moreover a distributed ﬁle-system may provide a system ﬁle-local-caching. That
is, when a remote ﬁle is retrieved by a user, such ﬁle is also stored in the user's ma-
chine for future accesses. This fact reduces the network traﬃc, by retaining recently
accessed disk blocks in such cache, so that repeated accesses to the same information
can be handled locally. If required data is not cached yet, a copy of data is brought
from the server to the user.
Some example of well-known distributed ﬁle-systems are the Jade ﬁle-system [21]
and the sun network ﬁle-system [25].
Since distributed ﬁle-system allows to share objects among diﬀerent users, each of
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them could (theoretically) have access to every object contained in it; a privacy issue
is thus emerged. Therefore a protocol which regulates the users interactions and the
object accesses has to be deﬁned.
Usually each user owns a certain set of permissions on a given ﬁle-system object
(capabilities) . A decision process uses these rules to establish whether a user can
perform a requested action on a requested object. The protocol which rules how users
can have access to the ﬁle-system objects is called Access Control Model (ACM).
Historically the ﬁrst remote ﬁle-servers were developed in the 1970s. In 1976
Digital Equipment Corporation created the File Access Listener (FAL [5]), an imple-
mentation of the Data Access Protocol as part of DECnet Phase II which became
the ﬁrst widely used network ﬁle system. In 1985 Sun Microsystems created the ﬁle
system called "Network File System" (NFS [27][24]) which became the ﬁrst widely
used Internet Protocol based network ﬁle system. Other notable network ﬁle systems
are: Andrew File System (AFS [1]), Apple Filing Protocol (AFP [12]), NetWare Core
Protocol (NCP [20]), and Server Message Block (SMB [16][17]) which is also known
as Common Internet File System (CIFS [30][17]).
The presented work has been developed in Bell-Labs Ireland (Dublin) in July-
November 2012. It was also submitted and then successfully presented at the 7th
International workshop on plan 9 [9] the 16th in November 2012.
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Part II
Related work
In order to design an eﬃcient and state-of-the-art access control model, some of the
most widely known and deployed standards for ﬁle-system access control have been
considered.
Particularly, our work was greatly inspired to the POSIX Access Control Lists
(ACLs) [2, 11]. POSIX ACLs overcome some of the limitations of the old UNIX
ﬁle-system [28], allowing for the deﬁnition of multiple per-user and per-group rules,
providing a great liberty of ﬂexibility in expressing access-control rules. Even though
the ACL model presents some limitations (as highlighted in [23]), they are used in
the most modern operating systems. Some systems implement an abbreviated form
of ACL by restricting the assignment of authorizations to a limited number of named
group of users, like expressed by [23].
The access-control model proposed in this document is also based on attaching
lists of access-control rules to ﬁles, therefore our model is also referred to as an ACL
model, even though there are various diﬀerences with the standard POSIX ACL (see
Section 2 for details).
In order to represent the set of allowed permissions for users or user groups, the
classical concept of a bit-mask has been used, similarly to the UNIX ﬁle-system [28].
However, the set of allowed permission bits does not match perfectly UNIX. For
example, we do not support the right of execution for ﬁles (that would not have sense
in a distributed system); also, taking inspiration from NTFS [29], the co-owner bit
has been added, used in ACL entries to deﬁne which users are co-owners of the ﬁle,
i.e., they can manage its ACL settings.
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Also, in our model the concepts of users and groups are somewhat uniﬁed, being
also possible to deﬁne arbitrary nesting levels among groups of users. This behavior
can be thought of as a ﬂexible way to deﬁne users' roles and their hierarchical or
nesting relationships, hence can be compared to the expressiveness often found in
RBAC [26] models.
Our model design allows users to manage their own ﬁles permissions, allowing
for a completely discretionary access-control, as found in DAC [15] models. At the
same time, it is provided the possibility, for a system administrator (or speciﬁc set of
privileges users), to deﬁne upper-bound rules that cannot be overcome by regular
users, stealing some of the characteristics of typical MAC [15] models, and taking
inspiration from similar characteristic available in in NTFS. In this way we provided
a good trade-oﬀ between two diﬀerent kind of policies: Discretionary and Mandatory.
In the literature works as [4][3] and [32] have been also proposed, in order to ﬁnd this
trade-oﬀ.
Our implementation did not address comprehensively authentication, yet. How-
ever, a basic authentication mechanism has been realized, taking inspiration from
HTTP-Auth [10], used in the HTTP protocol, in which clients send their hashed
password to authenticate to the server. The authentication mechanism also re-uses
the everything is a ﬁle old paradigm of UNIX and further developed in the Plan9
OS [7]. Furthermore, we support a primitive mechanism for delegation [14] of author-
ity through oﬀ-line delegation certiﬁcates resembling Amoeba capability lists [18, 6].
Also an on-line delegation is available; in such case, as we will can see, certiﬁcates are
not necessary.
Various other access-control models for distributed ﬁle-systems have been pro-
posed in the literature, such as the WebFS [31] work, including a mechanism allowing
entities to delegate other entities in order to act on their behalf ([8] [19] and [33]) on
9
a set of deﬁned ﬁle-system objects, or others.
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Part III
Access control in Pepys
1 Introduction on Pepys
Pepys is an innovative distributed ﬁle-system born to meet the increasingly growing
demand, from users, to always have their data available anywhere.
Pepys is composed of a multitude of servers that, together, present a collection of
ﬁles organized in trees or volumes. It uses a hierarchy of caching ﬁle servers and a
set of archival storage servers, brought together through a common set of protocols
for data access and control. Moreover, in order to design a fault-tolerant system, ﬁles
may be replicated among servers; doing so it is even possible to improve the speed of
ﬁles fetching (the same approach is also used by [31]).
In Pepys, when a new ﬁle is created, it is not necessary that every directory present
into the path is present. For example, the ﬁle named /a/b/f can exist in the ﬁle-
system without requiring existence of /a/b and/or /a. The existing object having a
name with the longest preﬁx matching the name of another object merely becomes
the guard of said other object. For example, if /a and /a/b/f exist and /a/b not,
then /a is the guard of /a/b/f. The guard relationship among objects ultimately
regulates how exactly access control is performed, within the Pepys ﬁle-system, as it
will be detailed in section 2.
Pepys is a versioned ﬁle-system, i.e., when a ﬁle is modiﬁed, a new version of the
ﬁle is added to the system, that keeps storing all the previous versions. This way it
is always possible to keep track of the ﬁles history. Versioning allows for an eﬃcient
caching of ﬁles.
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Moreover, ﬁles in Pepys may have attributes. These are deﬁned in the same name
space as for the regular ﬁles. For example, if owner is a valid attribute for the ﬁle
/a/b/f, then its complete name is /a/b/f/owner. To avoid confusion between ﬁles
and attributes, a special character is used in the ﬁle operations when referring to
attributes.
Pepys is composed by two diﬀerent types of process: ΠP client and ΠP server
(see 1). The ﬁrst one, as the name suggests, is a client-side process which represents
the connected user and its requests of operations onto the ﬁle-system. The second
one instead is a server-side process, which purpose is to process the user's requests,
and to reply to him.
Pepys uses a new transport protocol (called ΠP ) in order to minimize the round-
trip message exchanges, between a ΠP client and a ΠP server, necessary to perform ﬁle
operations. The protocol allows to send, to the server, multiple consecutive requests
in a single packet (these request are packed by ΠP clients). Thanks to this approach,
ΠP servers perform clients requests one by one, and send back a set of responses in
order to communicate the operations outcome. In order to better understand how
ΠP works, let us make an example. Let us suppose that a client wants to open a
ﬁle named test and write into it a line of text. The used protocol allows to pack
a single request which contains three statements: open test; write line; close
test. After that the ΠP client will send such packet to the ΠP server, which will
perform the required operations and, ﬁnally, it will send to the ΠP client a response.
Being still under heavy development, Pepys has various features still under imple-
mentation, or merely at a design stage. For example, Pepys was not including any
mechanism for access control, yet. This document describes the work that has been
done in order to add an Access-Control Model to the Pepys distributed ﬁle-system,
complying with the general principles behind the Pepys design.
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Figure 1: Pepys components.
Pepys ﬁle-system is currently implemented on top of a new operating system called
Osprey [22] (see ﬁgure 1), providing an alternative approach to cloud computing, and
speciﬁcally aiming to improve latency and predictability of cloud applications and
support for mobility. In order to read a detailed explanation of Osprey, please refer
to [22].
A key component in the overall architecture is the ΠP protocol, supporting all
Pepys operations, including various interactions with the Osprey kernel itself.
As showed in ﬁgure 1, the original Pepys server we modiﬁed included ΠP Ram,
basically an in-RAM ﬁle-system. ΠP Ram contains data structures and functions to
manage ﬁle-system objects and the accesses to them. Particularly it contains struc-
tures which represent ﬁles (or guards) and the necessary functions to create/write/read
them. Such ﬁle-system is referred as non-persistent ﬁle-system, basically because its
content cannot survive to a system reboot.
As explained in 3.1, this structure has been extended to keep ﬁles on a Linux (and
generally POSIX) ﬁle-system, and to support our new AC model.
Finally, from now on, the terms server and system will be interchangeably used
to refer the ΠP server.
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2 Access Control
In this section an overview of the access control model, with its main aspects, is
shown.
Particularly, our access control model has to cover these aspects:
• each user is free to deﬁne the access control rules for its own objects, in the
most ﬂexible way possible;
• the traditional distinction between users and groups is replaced by a uniﬁed
vision of such entities;
• access control rules can be speciﬁed at a generic abstraction level, considering
sets of ﬁles and sets of users, then reﬁned for speciﬁc subsets of those ﬁles and/or
users;
• however, each user freedom is constrained by the rules dictated by system ad-
ministrators, if any;
• re-using the everything is a ﬁle approach to manage as many operations as
possible, including operations involving the administration of the access-control
operations, such as editing of ACL rules or creation of users.
More details on the speciﬁc aspects are reported below.
2.1 Entities
The diﬀerence between users and groups has been overcome by introducing the con-
cept of entities, representing users or groups of users, that can be authorized or denied
the access to portions of the ﬁle-system.
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An entity represents the subject who has request to perform an action onto the
ﬁle-system. A trivial example could be this: let us suppose that user Sam wants to
create a ﬁle; in such case Sam, as being the subject of the operation, is the entity.
Every operation within the ﬁle-system is performed by entities.
In order to make the system security administration as scalable as possible, entities
(i.e., users and groups) can belong to others entities. If needed, a system can be
conﬁgured in such a way that a nesting relationship becomes valid when both involved
entities agree about it. An entity has to be aware of the fact that, adding another
entity in the set of entities belonging to it, is equivalent to giving them all the access
rights to which it is entitled, unless otherwise overridden by more speciﬁc rules.
This feature can be also easily retrieved in the real life. Let us suppose that a
person is registered at a rental movies center, and for this reason it owns a card that
it has to show every time it wants to rent a movie. We can state that the set of people
which own such card are the group of person which are able to rent a movie in the
same movie center. Let us suppose now that the movie center belongs to a company
which holds a set of equal centers. In this case a person will be able to rent movie in
one of them without distinction. Of course exceptions are possible: for example the
company can own diﬀerent types of movie centers where diﬀerent cards are requested.
In this case, in order to rent movie in diﬀerent movie centers, a person has to own
diﬀerent cards, hence it belongs to diﬀerent groups.
In our approach there are no limitations for the nesting level of the belong-to
relationship, which is to be considered a transitive relationship. For example if Sam
belongs to Nilo, and Nilo belongs to Tommaso, then Sam belongs (indirectly) to
Tommaso.
Hence, a belong-to relationship between two entities can be:
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1. Direct
2. Indirect (if transitively inherited).
The ﬁrst kind of relationship is considered stronger than the second one, from an
access-control (AC) perspective, meaning that an AC rule referring to a direct father
of a user has priority over an AC rule referring to a generic ancestor. The direct and
indirect ancestors of an entity can be visualized in a belong-to relationship priority
tree in which the entity under consideration is the root of the tree (see ﬁgure 2).
These trees (named belong-to trees or entities tree) represent the whole ances-
tor hierarchy of an entity. Trees are divided into levels, according the belong-to
relationship priority, these level are scanned one by one during the access control
algorithm 2.2.1.
Moreover, as we will see in section 2.3, an entity authentication is not mandatory.
An entity can decide whether or not to authenticate itself onto the system. Of course
the system will treat in diﬀerent ways authenticated entities from those who are not.
Two system-level entities are always deﬁned in the system, called others and
nobody. Each entity deﬁned in the system belongs implicitly to nobody, but only
in the weakest possible sense (see Section 2.2.1). The others entity instead is a
convenient way, in ACL rules, to refer to any authenticated user in the system. Also,
unauthenticated entities, as well as entities just logged onto the system, and about to
authenticate, are treated by the system as implicitly being the nobody entity. Also, is
the system implicitly considers that others belongs to nobody, as shown in ﬁgure 2.
Even though the name nobody could be misleading according what has just been said,
is due to the behavior held by the system to the entities that are not authenticated
(yet). Anyway the purpose of nobody and others is further detailed in section 3.6
Moreover since nesting of relationships can be arbitrarily added by users, loops
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Figure 2: Belong-to relationship tree, rooted at a generic entity E1.
are possible in the belong-to trees. Such a situation, albeit unusual, is still handled
by the implementation consistently.
2.2 Access Control Model
Each object in the ﬁle-system owns an ACL table which contains the access rules
governing access to it; each rule names an entity and its permissions to the object, as
shown in ﬁgure 3.
Each ACL can have one or more co-owners, which can manage the rules in such
ACL. At least one co-owner has to be always present, so to ensure that there is always
someone able to manage the object security settings. Therefore, the system forbids
the operation of deleting the ACL rule for the last co-owner. In other words if only
one co-owner is named in a certain ACL, its entry cannot be removed until it is the
only one contained in such ACL.
ACL rules apply generally to the object they are attached to, but are implicitly
and dynamically inherited also by all the objects having it as a guard (i.e., the children
ﬁles), and any other further object down the containment/guard hierarchy of objects
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Figure 3: Access control list (ACL).
(i.e., the whole subtree rooted at the object).
Normally, a rule attached directly to an object takes precedence over a rule at-
tached to its guard (father), or a rule attached to its guard's guard, etc. However,
there is a special type of rules, called non-overridable rules (o-rules), that forcibly
apply to the the whole subtree of the guarded ﬁles and cannot be overcome. Such
rules are designed to be used typically by system administrators to restrict the AC
settings that regular users may be willing to conﬁgure for their own created contents.
As a result, a regular rule in an object stating that an entity has certain permissions
is eﬀective only if there are not any o-rules, in its guards chain or in the object itself,
stating otherwise.
An ACL rule mentioning the others entity can be used to grant or deny access to
any user known to the system, when acting as an authenticated user. Also, an ACL
rule mentioning the nobody entity can be used to grant access to any user connected
to the system, and if combined with others (see 2.2.1 and 2.3), for those who are
not authenticated (yet). However, authentication is only partially addressed in Pepys
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(e.g., server authentication is unaddressed, so far), as a full mechanism will have to
be integrated with cryptography at the ΠP protocol level.
The type of supported permissions in the current design and implementation is
mostly inspired to traditional UNIX ﬁle-systems: read and write of ﬁles, traversability
of guards, ACL management (co-ownership) and delete permission (as found on NTFS
ﬁle-systems [29]). However, this tentative set of permissions can easily be extended to
more complex permissions or permission set. It is noteworthy to mention that, whilst
on traditional ﬁle-systems, the read permission over a folder refers to the ability to
read the folder contents, in Pepys it is planned to provide distinct permissions to read
a guard's children (the guarded/contained objects), and to read any ﬁles contained
in the corresponding sub-tree.
Another feature that is being discussed, from the ACM perspective, is the one
in which there are multiple guards for the same object, a situation resembling the
concept of link in traditional UNIX ﬁle-systems.
2.2.1 Decision Algorithm
At the core of the Pepys ACM there is the algorithm deciding whether or not to
grant a given user access to a given ﬁle for a given operation. The central idea for
such algorithm is: more speciﬁc rules take precedence over more generic ones. This
means that, if the entity can reach an object (permission given by the traversability
bit), AC rules directly attached to it have priority over AC rules inherited by guard
objects or other ancestors (the o-rules described above are the only exception, when
present).
The decision algorithm locating the proper permissions applying to a given entity
for a given operation (e.g., write) on a given object, can be expressed shortly in these
few steps:
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1. Traversability check: the system checks that the entity has the right to tra-
verse (e.g., 'x' permission bit) all the existing guards going from the ﬁle-system
root down to the desired object, looking at those guards ACL tables. The
traversability permission, in such tables, can either be granted directly to the
entity attempting the access, or indirectly through any of the entity parents or
ancestors, in the belong-to relationship;
2. Check if there is a rule for the entity in the object ACL;
(a) as soon as a match is found, its permissions mask are used to determine
the access;
3. Check if there is a rule for any ancestor of the entity (i.e., as due to the belong-
to speciﬁed relationships), giving priority to rules naming direct ancestors, then
2nd level ancestors, etc., up to nobody;
(a) as soon as a match is found, its permissions mask are used to determines
the access;
4. Get the inherited rules from the object guard and start again the algorithm
from step 2;
5. If there are no rules about the entity or for one of its ancestors the access is
denied.
It is important to say that the o-rules aﬀecting a given entity are combined with
the permissions mask returned by the algorithm above; this operation gives us the
eﬀective permissions which the entity owns on the object (see section 2.2.2).
Moreover, as we can see, it is been decided to give the priority to the entity
ancestors, named in the speciﬁc object, rather than a possible rule for the applicant
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entity in the object guard; this because we consider more accurate the rules contained
in the speciﬁc object rather than those in its guard.
Furthermore, since every entity belong to nobody entity, if the nobody ACL rule
is present, it allows to inhibit inheritance of guards rules; since the algorithm would
break at step 3. Same reasoning can be made for others applies to every authenti-
cated entity.
This makes the algorithm very ﬂexible since is possible decide when the decisional
process has to stop.
2.2.2 Access control rules
As reported brieﬂy in section 2.2, there are two kind of rules.
• Regular rules (r-rules)
• Not overriddable rules (or obligatory rules or o-rules)
The ﬁrst ones are the rules which are taken in account when we have to retrieve
the most speciﬁc rule, for a named entity, during the decision algorithm. Instead
the second ones can be considered merely as upper-bound rules which cannot be
overcome by regular rules. As detailed in section 2.2.1, when an entity tries to perform
an operation, the permissions as coming from regular rule matching its name are
intersected with the restrictions provided by a matching o-rule.
Particularly, when an o-rule is deﬁned in an ACL, it does not mean that the
named entity in the rule owns the expressed permissions, but merely that such entity
will not be granted more than those permissions, starting from the object where the
o-rule is placed. Hence if the object is a guard, the entity will not have more than
such permissions in the whole subtree held by the guard.
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Furthermore, while using regular rules it is possible to add exceptions for a named
entity in every level of a guards tree; o-rules can only narrow the permissions going
down to such tree. For example, assuming that the path a/b/c/.../f exists, if the
ACL of b contains an o-rule for a named entity, the rights for such entity (or its
members) cannot increase going down the tree (hence c/.../f).
If an administrator wants to add an exception to an o-rule, it has to add it in the
same ACL where the ﬁrst o-rule is deﬁned. For a detailed explanation see section 4.2.3.
The o-rules meaning is merely to contain the entity rights, inside a set of permis-
sions. This makes the life easier for a system administrator.
O-rules have always priority on regular rules. Therefore if an ACL contains an
o-rule which refers indirectly an entity and a r-rule which names directly such entity,
both are taken in account, not solely the r-rule. The operation requested in such case
is only allowed if the combination of both rules allows it.
Finally each entity can be directly named, in a rule (o-rule or r-rule), only once
in an ACL.
2.2.3 Delegation
Entities can delegate others entities in order to act in their behalf, on a given object.
Each delegation is associated with a speciﬁc object and contains: the name of the
delegator, the name of the delegatee, a set of permissions assigned to the delegatee, an
expiration date and a value which represents the depth of the trust chain (see below
in this section). Clearly, the permissions granted by delegation cannot be higher than
the ones held by the delegator on the object. Figure 4 shows a general delegation and
the ﬁelds contained in it.
Two kinds of delegation are possible:
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Figure 4: Delegation components.
1. On-line.
2. Oﬀ-line.
In the ﬁrst one the delegator issues the delegation to the system, merely specifying
in it who is the delegatee, its permissions, the depth of the trust chain and the ﬁle-
system object on which the delegation is applied. In the second way the delegator, as
well as ﬁll the delegation like the ﬁrst method, signs it and issues it to the delegatee.
When the delegatee wants to perform an action on behalf of the delegator, it will
present the delegation to the system. Figure 5 shows what has just been said: as we
can see, on-line delegations are performed by a single step, whereas the oﬀ-line ones
are performed by two diﬀerents steps.
In the ﬁrst case the signature is not required, since the system knows exactly who
is the delegator and its permissions (for the anonymous cases see 3.6). In the second
case the system, before to approve the delegation, has to know who is the issuer.
Therefore the delegation has to be signed by the delegator.
The delegations are taken in account using the same algorithm described in 2.2.1,
and only if the access is denied using the regular ACL rules.
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Figure 5: Types of delegation.
Every entity can use its delegations in order to delegate other entities, so as to
build a chain of delegations (or trust chain). Every delegation in such chain cannot
have an expiration time beyond the one expressed in the delegation immediately above
(i.e., the delegation used to issue the new one). Therefore, the expiration time in the
head of the chain bounds the expiration time of all the delegations in such chain.
Moreover, the entity which issues a delegation, marks it with a number represent-
ing the maximum length of the trust chain from that point. Of course these numbers,
going down through the delegations chain, can only be smaller. Therefore the value
assigned by the ﬁrst delegator in the chain, represents the maximum length which
the chain can have. This value can also be null, in this case the trust chain length
is limitless. In ﬁgure 6 an example of trust chain in shown. As we can see the ﬁrst
delegator set a value as maximum trust chain length, which is decremented every time
a sub-delegation is issued. Once this value reached zero, it will not be more possible
to sub-delegate any entity.
Moreover it is always possible to revoke a delegation merely by resetting its expi-
ration time; the delegation will become thus no more valid.
The type of explained delegation so far is referred as grant delegation in the lit-
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Figure 6: Trust-chain length representation.
erature; this kind of delegation is also treated in [8]. In fact according to such work,
delegation of privileges may be classiﬁed into (at least) two diﬀerent family: grant
and transfer. In the ﬁrst case, following a successful delegation operation, allows the
delegated access rights to be available to both the delegator and the delegatee. In
the second case instead, once a delegator delegated a set of rights to a delegee, it lost
automatically such set of rights: a delegator does not able to beneﬁt of the delegated
rights. Our case is clearly the grant one. Such model is also referred as a mono-
tonic model since a delegated entity rights cannot be decreased, once a delegation is
successfully performed.
2.3 Authentication
Authentication of users has been temporarily realized as a simple (hashed) password
veriﬁcation. Authentication is not mandatory, to connect to the server. An entity
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can have access to the system without having authenticated itself. In this case, the
system considers the connected entity as being the nobody entity, thus the access-
control permission speciﬁed for such entity throughout the ﬁle-system apply. While
being connected to the system, an entity can authenticate itself whenever needed,
upgrading its session from the rights corresponding to the only nobody entity to the
rights associated with its actual name. Therefore until the user is recognized as to be
nobody, the corresponding permissions will be taken in account in order to delegate
other entities. Even though such delegations are (in most of the cases) purposeless,
they are anyway available.
One of the goals of the Pepys ﬁle-system is to become a content-distribution plat-
form. Supporting an unauthenticated state of the session is useful, in such context, to
realize a sort of incognito mode of access by which public contents can be distributed
worldwide without requiring users to reveal their identities.
Hence is clear that the system must be able to treat in a diﬀerent way the authen-
ticated entities from the other ones; this is achieved by using the couple others and
nobody. Indeed others refers to entities which are logged onto the system, instead
nobody to every entity present in the system (including both authenticated and not).
In order to better understand how these two entities are used, let us consider an
ACL table of a ﬁle-system object. An ACL entry referring to the others entity applies
to every user logged and authenticated onto the system but for which no other ACL
entries have been found in the ACL table; an ACL entry referring to the nobody
entity, instead, applies to every user logged onto the system, either authenticated
or not. ACL entries for others have priority over the ones for nobody, i.e., the AC
engine behaves as if the former entity were a subgroup of the latter one (see ﬁgure 2).
Finally, if a server needs to authenticate users before allowing access to its con-
tents, this can always be done by specifying the permissions wanted for the authen-
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ticated entities following the rules above (and using others if needed) and no access
rights for the nobody entity.
In literature some works which show a model where users are treated like the
presented one can be retrieved. An example can be [13], where a special ACL entry
to refer to every entity regardless of their credentials is used. Therefore such entry,
whose subject is named Anonymous, matches every user in the system. The meaning
of such entry is exactly the same of the Nobody one.
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3 Implementation Notes
In this part some implementation notes are shown; unfortunately for company conﬁ-
dentiality questions, it is impossible to publish the source code.
3.1 Porting on Linux
The ﬁrst step in our work was to unplug the Pepys ﬁle-system from its original
structure (showed in ﬁgure 1) and therefore build a layer, called Lib Posix, in order
to make the Pepys ﬁle-system runnable on UNIX machines.
In fact, thanks to the porting, we were able to use debug software, in order to
better implement the presented access control model. Even though Osprey has an own
set of tools, some these are not completed yet and also still under heavy development.
Moreover, in order to allow operations of swapping/loading objects from/into
RAM, a new component, called Pipdiskfs, has been added to the POSIX version of
Pepys server.
Particularly, thanks to the Pipdiskfs layer is possible to swap (or to load), from
the RAM, whole ACLs tables or parts of them (for example few entries of a table).
Similarly is also possible to swap (or to load) entire entities or merely parts of them.
Of course is also possible to swap/load regular ﬁles.
Furthermore this layer ﬁlls the existent gap between the Pepys and the UNIX
ﬁle-system. For example, guards in Pepys have been realized by directories in Linux.
As has been said in 1, Pepys is composed by two diﬀerent parts: server and client.
In order to let communicate these two parts, the porting has been realized by using
the FIFO queues; provided by all UNIX ﬁle-systems. In this way clients and servers
store their ΠP messages into these queues in order to communicate.
These queues are very simple: each process (ΠP client or ΠP server both) instan-
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Figure 7: Porting on Linux implementation.
tiates an own named pipe (where the name of the process is the same of the pipe)
which will be used to retrieve the incoming messages. In fact a named pipe (also
referred as FIFO for its behavior) is system-persistent and exists beyond the life of
the process. Processes generally attach to the named pipes (usually appearing as a
ﬁle) to perform inter-process communication (IPC). In this kind of special-ﬁles each
message is stored as if the ﬁle were a FIFO queue. When a Pepys client has to send a
message to a server, it has to know the name of the server. Therefore the client will
be able to perform a write operation on the server named pipe. Since diﬀerent clients
can communicate with the same server, they must be able to write in the the same
named pipe without interfere each other. Therefore they must have exclusive access
to the server named pipe each time the have to send a message. In order to let this
possible a shared memory portion, in which processes can synchronize themselves,
has been used. In order to see how a memory portion can be shared among processes,
please refer to shmget manual.
The implementation is conceptually shown in ﬁgure 7.
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Figure 8: File-System structure.
3.2 File-System Structure
Inside the ﬁle-system, entities are represented by special guards, which own a set of
special ﬁles. Moreover, as we can see in ﬁgure 8, each entity is associated with a home
object (folder) over which it has full control.
Particularly each entity guard (e.g., E1 in ﬁgure 8) holds:
Ibelto/Beltome: necessary to establish a new relationship.
Approved: list of entities which the named one belongs to
Proxies: provides a mechanism for permissions delegations.
e-ﬁles: others entity ﬁles as, for example, entity public key.
Each entity guard is managed by the guard above called /entities, which holds also
a special ﬁle called Login in order to allow entities authentication.
An ACL table is represented by an object attribute, which can be changed only
by the co-owners as reported in such ACL.
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Instead an object delegation is a special object attribute, managed by the system,
and hidden from the user's point of view.
The motivations behind this implementation is discussed in section 2.2.3.
3.3 Entities relationship
When an entity wants to become member of another entity's users group, it writes
the name of the other entity in its Ibelto ﬁle (over which it normally has write
permission). The other entity (or the system administrator), on its own, has to write
the name of the ﬁrst entity in its Beltome ﬁle, in order for the new relationship to
become eﬀective. For each entity, the eﬀective Ibelto relationships are reported in
the approved special object within the entity folder, normally accessible to it for
reading.
It is impossible for an entity to remove from its parents the system entities nobody
or others. Also, depending on how the system is being administered, it is possible
to allow users to write to their own Ibelto ﬁle, enabling them to propose changes
to their belong-to relationship, including their removal from groups they belong to.
On the other hand, it is equally possible to forbid such write operations, leaving the
administration of users and groups entirely to system administrators, as it commonly
happens in nowadays operating systems.
In order to express the willingness to belong to another entity, a user has to write
in its ibelto ﬁle the entity name, using this syntax:
[first entity name ]:[ second entity name ]:...:[ last entity name]
Consequently, in order to express the willingness to be the father of an entity, a
user has to write its name in the beltome ﬁle, using the same syntax.
In our implementation, when the agreement is reached, the relationship become
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eﬀective.
3.4 Collection of entity rules
One of the biggest challenges was to dynamically collect the o-rules, referred to a
given entity, without heavily impact on the model performances.
Since these kind of rules have the highest priority on every one else, they have to
be taken in consideration every time they change. Even though a new o-rule could be
propagated in all the objects held from the one where is applied, this would heavily
impact in system performances, by making really slow any rules modiﬁcation.
In order to ﬁnd a good trade-oﬀ between adaptiveness and performances, o-rules
are collected during the walk procedure; which is performed to check if an entity is
able to reach the ﬁle-system object in which the operation has been requested. This
seems to be a really good solution since, in any case, an entity has always to walk to
reach an object. Hence the retrieved rules can be easily collected.
Anyway this approach implies a drawback. Let us suppose that the path /a/b/c/d/.../f
exist, and an entity walks from a to the object d. During the walk the o-rules are col-
lected. Let us assume that such entity, once it reached the object, uses it but leaves it
opened (e.g, let us think about a ﬁle-system window in which a user browses ﬁles and
directories). Even thought a new o-rule (about such entity) is added in the object a,
next entity walk will start from the object d (it is left opened), hence the new o-rule
will not be collected. In order to avoid these situations, every time a new o-rule is
added, all the walk operations (of every entity) should start from the ﬁle-system root
path. This solution would imply, clearly, a heavy performances leakage. Therefore
the collected o-rules are refreshed when an entity visits an object. Moreover, when
an entity closes the object reached by a walk, its next walk will start from the root
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guard, hence o-rules will be collected again.
Of course an entity can have more than one opened object. In this case if it closes
one, it is always able to continue to walk using another opened object (let us think
again to have two diﬀerent ﬁle-system windows).
Moreover the proposed solution does not impact on the model consistence. In fact
it is lawful suppose that if an entity is able to perform an action on an object, it has
the right permissions to do so. Therefore it should have such permissions for the time
the object is left opened.
In order to deﬁne if an entity owns the walk permission, during the walking pro-
cedure, (also) a regular rule in every visited object has to be searched. Since we have
to pick up a valid r-rule from the object ACL table, the rule we obtain is also stored,
so to have it already available during the access control algorithm. This impacts
positively on ACM performances in terms of execution time and complexity.
The caches are realized by a stack of rules. In this way when a user performs a
forward walk (e.g., from /a/b to /a/b/c) a new rule is pushed at the top of the stack.
When a user performs a backward walk (e.g., from /a/b/c to /a/b) the top stored
rule is popped out. By using such approach the ﬁrst top rule is the one concerning
the very object which the user is requesting.
Moreover when applying the algorithm 2.2.1 is requested to search for a rule in
the object guard, we do not need to visit such object in ﬁnding a rule. All we need
to do is a pop operation on the stack-cache in order to retrieve a valid rule.
Cases in which no rules have been found in an ACL, for a user, in the walk
operation, the last valid one is replicated.
Furthermore stack-caches are stored in the user session structure; and there is one
for each opened ﬁle-system object. Clearly whether a user performs a login, these
caches have to be completely invalidated, since its credentials are changed.
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Another preﬁxed goal was to let the delegation mechanism as an addictive optional
feature in our model. In order to do not impact on ACM performances, delegated
rules are not stored during the walks procedure. Delegations are checked dynamically
only if the requested action by an entity, according the ACL regular rules, would be
denied.
3.5 Delegation
As we said in section 2.2.3, two kinds of delegation are possible: on-line and oﬀ-line.
In both of these two cases the delegatee acts in behalf of the delegator.
A valid delegation acts like a temporary ACL entry, so the very ﬁrst idea could
be to change (temporary) the ACL tables to store a delegation rule. However, the
delegator might not have permissions to administer an object ACL but still willing
to delegate some other entity to perform actions on its behalf on that object.
The proposed model allows for this kind of scenarios, merely allowing to each
entity to solely write/read its own proxies ﬁles. As a consequence, the system will
make the requested delegations eﬀective, or ignore them, if they are invalid.
Moreover a delegation can contain a subset of permissions held by the delegator
on a given object. Therefore it is not mandatory to delegate an entity with all the
permission held by the delegator. For example let us suppose that entity1 wants
to delegate entity2 on the object file in which entity1 owns the whole set of
permissions (i.e., cdrwx). entity1 can only delegate entity2 to read, not necessarily
to have the same rights of entity1.
On-line delegation In the on-line delegation, when an entity wants to delegate
other entities to act in its behalf, it has to write the delegation in its proxies ﬁle.
Speciﬁcally it has to indicate who is the delegatee, its permission, an expiration date,
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depth of delegation chain and the object to which the delegator is referring to.
After that, the system will consider the delegation as eﬀective only if it is compliant
with the delegator's permissions on the speciﬁed object (i.e., an entity cannot delegate
permissions it does not possess over a ﬁle-system object).
The right syntax to use to issue an on-line delegation is:
[delegatee name ]:[ permissions ]:[ depth chain ]:[ expiration date ]:[ object]
Let us suppose therefore that entity1 wants to delegate entity2 (and only it) to
read an object named file up to 14th in November 2013. proxies ﬁle has to contain
the following line:
entity2:r:0:00/00/00/14/11/2013: file
Oﬀ-line delegation In the oﬀ-line delegation method, the delegator composes a
delegation, it signs it, and it stores it somewhere in the ﬁle-system. The delegatee
must specify in its proxies ﬁle who is the delegator and a valid path where the signed
delegation is stored. The system then checks the delegation signature using the public
delegation key available in the entity folder, and, only if the veriﬁcation succeeds, the
delegation is considered eﬀective.
Therefore, this time, the proxies ﬁle has to contain two ﬁelds, speciﬁcally:
[delegator name ]:[ path where the delegation is stored]
In the example mentioned in the above paragraph, by supposing that the delegator
stores its delegation in the path /deleg/to_entity2, entity2 has to write in the
proxies ﬁle:
entity1 :/deleg/to_entity2
The ﬁrst information is necessary to the system in oder to retrieve the correct
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Figure 9: Unauthenticated session.
public key (in order to verify the delegation signature); the second one to know where
the delegation can be found.
The syntax of the delegation is the same showed in the above paragraph:
[delegatee name ]:[ permissions ]:[ depth chain ]:[ expiration date ]:[ object]
3.6 Authentication
When a client logs onto a Pepys server, it is not required to authenticate itself imme-
diately, resulting in a session being in an unauthenticated state (see ﬁgure 9).
This means that the nobody access rights apply for the client, whenever an opera-
tion on the ﬁle-system is attempted. The client can authenticate itself at any time by
using the special ﬁle Login. Speciﬁcally, when an entity wants to upgrade its session
(see ﬁgure 10), it has to write its (SHA-256) hashed password using a write command.
In section 6.8 will be showed how the login procedure has been implemented.
The server compares the hashed password with the one stored in the entity pass-
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Figure 10: Session switching.
word ﬁle, and, if they match, the entity session is upgraded to an authenticated state.
From now on, the actual identity of the entity is used for checking the access rights
of the user.
Note that the Login ﬁle is a special ﬁle, in that it does not really stored any
password. Such ﬁle can be opened by multiple remote clients concurrently without
problems, as in the implementation the authentication material being provided by
each client is kept into a separate buﬀer associated with each session.
Moreover thanks to the characteristics of the ΠP protocol to group multiple re-
quests in the same message, it is possible for a remote client to stuﬀ, within a single
round-trip interaction with a Pepys server, the set-up of a session, opening of the
Login ﬁle and writing of the password, opening of the target ﬁle-system ﬁle and issue
of the desired read or write operation.
However, the very simple authentication protocol realized so far is also relatively
weak, in that it is easily subject to replay attacks, thus it can be improved by adding
a time-stamp to the hashed password to be written into the Login ﬁle, or a server-
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provided random number (i.e., a nonce). Though, the last mechanism would require
at least two round-trips with the server.
Finally, we plan to review and improve the authentication mechanism by integrat-
ing it with cryptographic extensions of the ΠP protocol which are being designed at
the time of writing, that will allow for having encrypted client-server interactions.
3.7 File-system tools
The developed software included, in addition to the Pepys ﬁle-system porting, a few
other tools:
1. Administration tool allowing for initializing the ﬁle-system, specifying:
(a) Entities allowed and their login password.
(b) Server name.
(c) Mount point (on the underlying Linux ﬁle-system) to allow for swap-
ping/loading of objects from/into the RAM.
(d) Path of directory that will contain temporary ﬁles (i.e., named FIFOs
currently used for client/server communications).
2. An interactive terminal in which is possible interact with the Pepys ﬁle-system
(create ﬁles, administer ACL settings).
3. A set of ad-hoc tests to test the main ﬁle-system features.
In the next sections the purpose of each of these will be explained in detail.
3.7.1 Conﬁguration ﬁle
In order to ease the conﬁguration of the ﬁle-system, an administration tool has been
created.
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Particularly, a ﬁle in which specify the allowed users and some of initials conﬁgu-
rations, has been provided.
Let us see an example:
1 # Example of config file
2 # This is a comment line
3
4 # Server name
5 server: sam
6
7 # Set the disk mount point
8 mount: ~/Alcatel -Lucent/Pepys/Porting/DISK/root
9
10 # Set the keys directory
11 # Public keys mast be named: pubkey
12 # Private keys (if there are) must be named: privkey
13 # This path must contain directories named as the represented entities
14 keys: ~/Alcatel -Lucent/Pepys/Porting/DISK/RSA_keys
15
16 # Entities allowed
17 # Format: entity: Name Password
18 entity: entity1 asd
19 entity: entity2 asd
20 entity: entity3 asd
21
22 # Temp file path
23 tmpdir: /tmp/
Server name is used to represent the administrator entity within the ﬁle-system,
and in order to let the clients able to exchange ΠP messages with the server part.
The Pepys ﬁle-system mount point is expressed using the key-word mount. Inside
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such path is possible see the Pepys ﬁle-system structure mapped on Linux, as said
in 3.1.
The key-word key represents the path where the entities keys are stored. Speciﬁ-
cally such path has to contain a set of diﬀerent folders which are named as the entities
they represent. For example, according the above example of conﬁguration ﬁle, let
us suppose that the system has to own the public keys of the entities: entity1,
entity2 and entity3. The path contained in keys has to contain three directories
(or four if also the key of the serer has to be stored) named entity1, entity2
and entity3 (and sam if necessary). Each of these directories, in turn, contain
the public keys of the entity (renamed pubkey), therefore: $keys/entity1/pubkey,
$keys/entity2/pubkey and $keys/entity3/pubkey.
The allowed Entities in the ﬁle-system are speciﬁed by the key-word entity. Each
entry has to contain the entity name and a password.
Finally is possible to specify the path where the FIFO queues are stored, by using
the key-word tmpdir.
It is important to say that none of these key-words are mandatory; if one or more
of these are not expressed, the default values are used.
Anyway if no entities are reported, no one will be able to authenticate itself. Every
entity in the system will be referred as the Nobody one within the system.
3.7.2 Interactive terminal
In order to access to the ﬁle-system, an ad-hoc terminal has been implemented.
Speciﬁcally some of the well-known Linux command has been replicated: echo,
cat, > () (output redirection), seftacl and getfacl. Moreover some new com-
mand are been added: login, logout and help.
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Echo The echo command prints a line of text in the standard output.
The syntax is:
echo line -of-text
Speciﬁcally using the quotes is possible to write, in the terminal, the exact line of
text contained between them.
Furthermore, by combining the echo command with the > (), is possible to write
in a ﬁle. For example let us suppose that we want to write the phrase Hello world!
in a ﬁle named asd.txt. In order to do so, the the right syntax to use is:
echo "Hello world !" > asd.txt
The execution of above line performs a trunc mode write, hence a new phrase is
stored to the ﬁle, truncating its whole content after that.
In order to append a new content at the end of a ﬁle, the symbol , combined
with the command echo, has to be used. For example, let us suppose that we want
to write My name is Nilo at the end of the same ﬁle. What we have to do is write
into the terminal:
echo "My name is Nilo" >> asd.txt
Finally, using the echo command, if the indicated ﬁle does not exist, it is created.
Cat The cat command, shows on the standard output the content of a ﬁle, which
is passed as argument.
The syntax is:
cat file
For example, if we use the cat command with the ﬁle asd.txt (used in the echo
paragraph):
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cat asd.txt
asd.txt:
Hello world!My name is Nilo
If the ﬁle does not exist, an error is returned.
Setfacl This command allows to add (and to delete) rules in ACL tables. setfacl
has been implemented regarding the POSIX one.
The syntax is:
setfacl [-m/-x][ entity ][:[ permissions ]] object
The option -m is used to add (or to modify) an ACL rule. In this case is mandatory
to express the entity name, the permissions to give to such entity and the ﬁle-system
object where the rule applies.
The option -x is used to delete an ACL rule. In such case the solely mandatory
values are the entity name and the ﬁle-system object.
Like already said in 2.2, the available permissions are: read (r), write (w), traversabil-
ity of guards (x), ACL management (c) and delete (d).
Let us assume that we want to give the write permission to tom in the ﬁle asd.txt.
The right command to use is:
setfacl -m tom:w asd.txt
Note that setfacl command used with -m does not always add a new rule in an
ACL table. Indeed, like said in section 2.2.2, if a rule which names the same entity is
already present; it is updated with the new given permissions.
In order to remove an ACL rule, -x option has to be used. For example if we
want to remove the rules which names tom from the ACL table of asd.txt, we have
to use the following syntax:
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setfacl -x tom asd.txt
Note that whether no rules which name the given entity are present, no errors are
returned.
Overall using setfacl, if the object does not exist, an error is returned.
Getfacl The command getfacl is used to display the current ACL table of a ﬁle-
system object.
The syntax is:
getfacl object
For example, let us suppose that we want to see the ACL table of asd.txt used
in the last paragraph, the right syntax to use is:
getfacl asd.txt
Assuming that asd.txt was created by the entity nilo and that we did not remove
tom among the ACL rules in the last paragraph, the result that getfacl shows will
be:
**** ACL TABLE ****
-crw - nilo
---w- tom
**** END TABLE ****
According this ACL table, nilo is the only ﬁle co-owner and it can (of course)
change the ACL rules, read and write the ﬁle. Instead the only action which tom is
able to perform is to write into the ﬁle.
Finally note that no one of the named entities owns the x permission. This because
traversability cannot be applied to ﬁles, and the execution mode is not contemplated
according what has been said in II.
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Login The login command allows entities to authenticate themselves to the system.
Therefore an eﬀect of thlogin command is to upgrade an entity session, from an
authenticated one to the authenticated one, like it has been explained in section 3.6.
The syntax is:
login password
The purpose of this command is merely to be a shortcut. Indeed, as reported
in 3.6, the authentication process is performed by writing a hashed password in the
login special ﬁle. Therefore this operation can be accomplished even by using the
echo command, if the hash of the password is known.
The steps performed by the login command are: hashing the passed password as
argument and to write the result into the login special ﬁle.
Note that, like expressed in 3.6, no real ﬁle write operation is performed. login
special ﬁle is merely an interface to let the entities able to authenticate themselves.
Logout The logout command allows entities to de-authenticate themselves from
the system.
The syntax is:
logout
Thanks to this command a session of an entity is downgraded to the unauthen-
ticated one. Therefore from now on the entity will be recognized as nobody (as
explained in section 3.6), until it authenticates it again.
Help Finally is also possible to see all this commands, with a little manual, by using
the help command.
The syntax is:
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help [(opt)command]
This command, without arguments show all the available commands with a short
description; otherwise it shows the command passed as argument with its description.
3.8 Ad-hoc tests
In order to test the behavior of the access control model, a set of ad-hoc tests are
provided.
These tests merely use the commands provided by the Pepys terminal, in order to
reproduce real situations, and to test the results given by the access control model.
The provided tests aim to cover every aspect of the proposed model, let us see
now each of them in detail.
Every test returns an OK message if all went well, FAIL if (at least) an error
occurred.
Note that each entity, generally, is only able to write starting from its own home
directory (see ﬁgure 8). In order to do not repeat the part of such path every time
we have to perform an action on a ﬁle, the ﬁrst part will be omitted. For example,
in order to have access to a ﬁle placed in /homes/nilo/a/b/file, we will use the
compressed path form /a/b/file.
Permission denied In this test there are two involved entities. The ﬁrst one,
named entity1 creates a ﬁle, then changes the access control rules in order to deny
the read access to another one entity named entity2.
After that, the entity entity2, logs onto the system and tries to read the same
ﬁle.
The test succeeded if such operation is denied.
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Entity nesting Entity nesting allows the permissions inheritance among entities,
as explained in section 2.1. In order to test this behavior an ad-hoc test was created.
In this test three entities are involved: entity1, entity2 and entity3.
First step is to create a relationship between entity1 and entity2; particularly
entity2 becomes a child of entity1. Same operation is performed between entity2
and entity3. Therefore the ﬁnal nested relationship entity3 ∈ entity2 ∈ entity1
has been created.
After that entity1 creates a new ﬁle in which it writes a line of text. After that
entity3 logs onto the system and tries to write in the same ﬁle.
The test succeeded if such operation is allowed.
Rules overriding In this test the o-rule behavior is shown. Three entities are
involved: entity1, entity2 and entity3.
First of all an entity named entity1 logs onto the system and creates a ﬁle
/a/b/file.
Note that for what has been said in section 1, it does not necessary that a and/or b
exist; the last existent one become automatically the guard of the new created object.
Anyway, since in this test also the object b is created, it becomes automatically the
file guard.
Moreover entity1 add an o-rule to the object b where denies to an entity named
entity3 to gain the read access from now on (i.e., beyond b.
Furthermore entity1 adds a regular rule in the ACL of b which states that the
named entity entity2 will be able to manage such ACL table.
After that entity2 logs onto the system and set an new rule in the file ACL (it
is able to do it according to the algorithm showed in section 2.2.1) in which gives the
read permission to entity3.
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After that entity3 logs onto the system and tries to read the content of file.
According the rule's precedence, every entity which belongs to entity3 (including
the entity itself), must not be able to read any object beyond b.
The test succeeded if the read operation requested by entity3 is denied.
Priority relationship This test case is thought to show the correct behavior of
the algorithm 2.2.1.
The ﬁrst step is to create the relationship: entity3 ∈ entity2 ∈ entity1 (as it
has been shown in the entity nesting paragraph).
After that an entity named entity4 creates a new ﬁle in which set two diﬀerent
rules, like reported below:
## ACL table ##
entity4: cdrw -
entity1: -----
entity2: --r--
After that entity3 logs onto the system and attempts to read the ﬁle. By scan-
ning sequentially the ACL table, the ﬁrst match for entity3 would be the one rep-
resented by the second line. Even though this would be a valid match, according the
entity3 entities-tree, the third line in the ACL table represents a more speciﬁc rule
for entity3.
Therefore, in order to consider the test passed successfully, the decision algo-
rithm 2.2.1 has to pick the third rule from the ACL table. Hence the test succeeded
if entity3 is able to read the ﬁle.
This test merely proves the priority rightness of the algorithm showed in sec-
tion 2.2.1.
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On-line delegation In this test the on-line delegation behavior is tested.
Three entities are involved: entity1, entity2 and entity3.
entity1 creates a new ﬁle in which denies the read operations to entity3, but
gives such right to entity2.
After that, entity2 logs onto the system and issues an on-line delegation to
entity3, where entity2 gives to entity3 the permission to read in behalf of entity2;
for two seconds.
Therefore entity3 logs onto the system and tries to read the content of the ﬁle.
If the operation succeeded, entity3 waits for two seconds, then retries the same
operation.
If the ﬁrst read succeeded and the second one does not, the test succeeded.
Oﬀ-line delegation This test is very similar to the one explained in the above
paragraph.
In this case entity2 signs an oﬀ-line delegation and stores it in the path /a/b/delegation.
After that the same test showed in the last paragraph is repeated, using this kind
of delegation.
Again, if the ﬁrst attempt of read performed by entity3 succeeded and the second
one fail, the test succeeded.
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4 Some examples
In the proposed ACM, a good trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and simplicity of setup has
been targeted. As it has been said, this goal was achieved by merging the concepts
of users and groups in the solely concept of entities and by adding the concept of
o-rules.
Let us see now some examples which show how this model aims to face some
common situations. In order to better understand when we are talking about a group
(i.e., an entity which contains at least another entity) the expression g-entity will be
used.
4.1 Deny access to a deﬁned set of users
It is common that a system administrator wants to deny the access to a particular
directory tree (guards in Pepys), or merely to a given ﬁle, from a user or a group of
them.
Let us suppose that the administrator does not want a g-entity to be able to
write on a deﬁned ﬁle, clearly supposing that g-entity (and each entity which belongs
to it) is not a ﬁle co-owner.
Instead of adding a new rule for each entity belonging to g-entity (even though
rightful), thanks to the entity concept itself, this situation can be solved merely adding
a new rule in the ﬁle ACL.
Assuming that the administrator name is Admin, the ACL table is:
## ACL table ##
Admin: cdrw
g-entity: --r-
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Of course it is also possible to add exceptions for speciﬁed entities which belong
to the g-entity.
For example if the administrator wants that only x-entity, which belongs to
g-entity, is able to write on such ﬁle, a new rule has to be added:
## ACL table ##
Admin: cdrw -
g-entity: --r--
x-entity: --rw-
Hence when an entity which belongs to g-entity, but diﬀerent to x-entity, tries to
write in the ﬁle, the access will be denied. Instead for x-entity will be grant.
It is also important to remark that the order in which these two rules are placed
in the ACL table is irrelevant for the algorithm outcome.
The case in which a ﬁle co-owner belongs to g-entity is meaningless in this
scenario; because being a co-owner, it would be able to change the rule. We will see
in 4.2 how these kind of problems can be addressed.
4.2 Not overridable rules
Another possible scenario may be one in which an administrator wants to let the users
free to manage the access rules for their objects, but restricting the rights which they
can have/assign.
Assuming the path a/b/c/d/.../f exists; let us see some examples which show
how an administrator can manage the access rights to the objects contained in such
path.
Moreover, the whole ﬁle-system subtree rooted by (for example) the guard b, will
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be indicated using the expression beyond the guard b.
4.2.1 Rights restriction
Let us suppose that g-entity1 is a co-owners of guard c:
## ACL of c ##
Admin: cdrwx
g-entity1: cdrwx
Let us suppose, moreover, that the administrator wants to establish a rule for the
entity g-entity2:
• g-entity2 must not be able to delete objects starting from b.
In order to achieve this goal, the administrator, has to add an o-rule for g-entity2
in the ACL table of b:
## ACL of b ##
Admin: cdrwx
g-entity2: !c-rwx #o-rule
In this way, the delete right to every entities belonging to g-entity2 starting from
the guard b, is denied.
This does not mean that g-entity1 cannot assign the delete permission to g-entity2
(or at one of its members); but merely that if it does that, it will not take eﬀect:
## ACL of d ##
Admin: cdrwx
g-entity2: cdrwx #d bit does not take effect
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In the last table g-entity2 being a co-owner of the d, can assign the delete permission
to other entities. Therefore such entities will be able to delete the objects where they
own such permission. This does not create inconsistencies since, according to the
o-rule expressed in b, g-entity2 can have the rights of co-owner and only it (and its
members) has to be unable to delete objects.
4.2.2 Contained rights
Let us suppose now that the administrator wants to establish these rules that cannot
be overcame beyond the guard b:
• g-entity1 and g-entity2 are the only co-owners allowed (together with their
members).
• Deny the delete permission to anyone else.
In order to do so, the administrator has to add three rules in the b ACL:
## ACL of b ##
Admin: cdrwx
g-entity1: !cdrwx #o-rule
g-entity2: !cdrwx #o-rule
nobody: !--rwx #o-rule
The ﬁrst two rules are necessary because, otherwise, the system would pick the
nobody o-rules also when g-entity1 (or g-entity2) walks through the guard b. In
fact as expressed in 2.1, every entity in the system belongs to nobody.
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4.2.3 The o-rules exceptions
Using the o-rules is impossible to add exceptions for a named entity beyond the ﬁrst
one. This fact means that if an o-rule applies for an entity in the guard b, the
permissions held by the entities which belong to it (and the entity itself) cannot be
increased in the guards c, or d etc. Permissions expressed by these rules can only be
decreased, over the ﬁrst one, going down to the same ﬁle-system tree.
For example, let us suppose that x-entity belongs to g-entity1, and that the
administrator wants to establish these rules beyond b:
• Deny to g-entity1 to delete the objects.
• Let free x-entity to delete the objects.
In this case the table is:
## ACL of b ##
Admin: cdrwx
g-entity1: !c-rwx #o-rule
x-entity: !cdrwx #o-rule
Therefore each member of g-entity1, except for x-entity, will not be able to delete
objects beyond b.
Again, if the o-rule for x-entity would be wrote in the ACL of the guard c, it
would not be taken under consideration.
We will see in section 6.6 why is not possible add an exception to an o-rule by
using a r-rule.
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4.2.4 Freedom of decision
This is example is a merely generalization of those ones above. We show how an
administrator can let the users free to decide how to manage their objects (so who
are the co-owner etc), but prohibiting to anyone to accomplish a given action.
Let us assume that the administrator does not want that anyone deletes the objects
beyond the guard b; but for the remain rights the users can decide for themselves.
In such case the ACL table should be:
## ACL of b ##
Admin: cdrwx
nobody: !c-rwx #o-rule
Furthermore, the rule above does not implies that everybody in the system (rep-
resented by nobody) can manage the objects beyond b, but merely that the objects
co-ownership is denied to no one.
If only the logged users can be declared as co-owners, a new rule rule has to be
added:
## ACL of b ##
Admin: cdrwx
others: !c-rwx #o-rule
nobody: !--rwx #o-rule
4.3 Sticky bit example
This example shows how to implement a behavior sticky bit like.
Our goal is to let the logged users free to create their own objects, in a given
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directory, but to make they able to delete only the ones they are created. In our
model the ﬁle-system object creation is associated with w bit.
Assuming that the path /a/ exists, let us see how is possible achieve the preﬁxed
goal.
The ACL table of a should be:
## ACL of a ##
Admin: cdrwx
others: --rwx #o-rule
nobody: !---- #o-rule
According to this table, each authenticated entity is able to create objects in a.
Particularly when a new object is created (assuming by x-entity), its ACL, by
default, is:
## ACL of a generic object ##
x-entity: cdrwx
With these two tables, entities diﬀerent from the one who has created the ﬁle-system
object, will not be able to delete such object.
In this case, anyway, every entity is able to write in every object contained in a.
If we want that only the owner may be able to do so, it has to add a new rule in its
objects.
## ACL of a generic object ##
x-entity: cdrwx
others: --r-x
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Therefore, unfortunately, this mechanism is not atomic; but it is deployable only
through two steps.
4.4 O-rules and R-rules
Let us see how an inappropriate use of the o-rules combined with r-rules can cause
unpleasant situations.
Assuming that x-entity1 is the only co-owner of b:
## ACL of b ##
x-entity1: cdrwx
nobody: -----
and x-entity2 is the only co-owner of c:
## ACL of c ##
x-entity2: cdrwx
nobody: -----
In this conﬁguration no one is able change the object c except x-entity2. In fact,
according to the c ACL table, if an entity diﬀerent from x-entity2, tries to modify
such ACL, the others entry will be picked by the decision algorithm. Therefore the
requested operation will be denied according the rule expressed by the picked entry.
Even though x-entity1 is unable to change directly the ACL of c, it can change
the b one. Particularly it can add this new rule:
## ACL of b ##
x-entity1: cdrwx
x-entity2: !-----
nobody: -----
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Hence the object c cannot be modiﬁed by anyone, unless x-entity1 removes the o-rule.
4.5 File-system conﬁguration
Let us see how can be conﬁgured a simple ﬁle-system. In this example we are con-
sidering the structure shown in section 8.
These rules have to be deﬁned:
• Entities must be able to read, write and traverse the objects guarded by its own
guard (guarded by entities).
• Entities must not be able to manipulate the objects guarded by the guards of
other entities (guarded by entities).
• Entities must not be able to manipulate the content directly guarded root.
• Entities must not be able to manipulate the content directly guarded by entities.
• Each entity can manipulate its home and the objects guarded by it.
• Each entity must be able to authenticate itself.
Below is shown a possible ﬁle-system conﬁguration which is compliant with the rules
just deﬁned.
## root ACL ##
Admin: cdrwx
nobody: --r-x
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## entities ACL ##
Admin: cdrwx
nobody: --r-x
## home ACL ##
Admin: cdrwx
nobody: --r-x
## x-entity guard ACL (guarded by entities) ##
## the same for all objects guarded by it##
Admin: cdrwx
x-entity: --rwx
nobody: -----
## home ACL of x-entity ##
Admin: cdrwx
x-entity: cdrwx
## login ACL ##
Admin: cdrwx
nobody: --rw -
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Figure 11: Main model operations complexity. N: number of entities, A: number of the ACL entries, M: size of
hash table.
Figure 12: Matching operation between ACL list and entities tree complexity. N: number of entities, A: number
of the ACL entries.
5 Performances
In this section some results which show the performances of the discussed ACL model
are presented.
Since our purpose was not to create a high performance model, it will be reported
how some improvements can be made.
A summary of complexities is also shown in ﬁgure 11 and ﬁgure 12.
Moreover each test was performed on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @
2.50 GHz machine using Linux Ubuntu 12.04.1 Precise Pangolin.
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Figure 13: Entity creation process.
5.1 Add a new entity
When an administrator wants to create a new entity, it is necessary to check that
such entity does not already exist.
Therefore is necessary to scan the entities list to check whether the new one can be
created. Since a regular list has been used to keep track of the entities, this operation
grows linearly with the number of entities present.
In ﬁgure 13 is shown a graphical representation of the necessary time to create
a new entity (Y axis), as function of the number of entities already present in the
system (X axis).
The experiment was conducted as follows: ﬁrst, a ﬁle-system with a preﬁxed
amount of entities was created; then, a new entity has been added recording the
spent time to perform such operation. As we can see, this time grows linearly with
the number of already existing entities.
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Figure 14: Alphabetic binary-tree example.
If N represents the amount of entities present in the system; by using a regular
list, the used space to store such list and the time spent to update it, have complexity
O(N).
A more clever approach may be to use an alphabetic ordered binary-tree in which
entities are stored according their names. In such case the update/creation operation
is performed with a complexity of O(logN), whereas the allocated space has still
complexity O(N). In such tree each node reports the entity name, and can points to
other two child nodes.
An example of alphabetic binary-tree is shown in ﬁgure 14.
In this case when an entity has to be retrieved, we can traverse the binary tree
starting from the root and by choosing the branch to follow merely by performing a
diﬀerence by the entity names. For example, let us suppose that we have to check
whether the tree showed in ﬁgure 14 contains a node named David. We have to
start from the root and check whether David is alphabetic greater than the name
contained in it. In this case David is greater than Bob, hence the right branch
is followed. At this point David is checked with Charlie and, again, David is
alphabetically grater than Charlie. Since Charlie is a leaf, the three does not
contain any node named David.
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Finally a hash function could be used. In this case there would be two ways to
implement this approach: by using open-hashing and by using close-hashing. In the
ﬁrst case, when an entity has to be added, a possible collision is managed by using a
dynamic list of collided entities. Instead in the second case collisions can be managed
by adding the new entry in the ﬁrst available position in the hash table.
Complexity of this last approach depends of the hash table size. In fact if we rep-
resent such dimension as M, the operation of entity update/creation has complexity
O(1) if M >> N, whereas the allocated space is obviously linearly with M, hence
O(M).
Since in a real scenarios it is correct to assume that not a so large amount of
entities are managed by the same system; the binary-tree approach seems to reach
the best trade-oﬀ between scalability and speed of execution.
Anyway, these operations are performed only when a new entity has to be cre-
ated. Therefore such operations are not supposed to be performed so often in a real
distributed ﬁle-system.
5.2 Build and scan entities trees
As reported in section 2.1, each entity in the system, owns a belong-to tree (or
entities tree) where it is the root. Entities tree is the most important structure in the
whole access control model because it is used every time the algorithm 2.2.1 must be
performed.
In this test the performances obtained in building and scanning the entities trees
are shown.
First, a certain amount of entities in relationship each other are set; then it will
be shown how much time is spent in order to obtain and to scan the whole entity tree
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Figure 15: Entities tree building procedure.
of an entity.
Relationships among entities are created using a random function with a uniform
distribution.
The ancestors value, reported as values of X axis in ﬁgure 15, has to be considered
as the sum of direct parents and inherited both.
As we can see from ﬁgure 15, the complexity of the operation grows quite linearly
with the number of ancestors which the selected entity has. Therefore if N is the
number of the ancestors, the complexity is O(N) for what concern the spent time and
the allocated space both.
Moreover, since all types of relationship nesting are allowed, cases of inﬁnite loop
may occur. These cases are avoided merely by using an integer which marks every
entity visited during the scan procedure.
In order to ﬁnd the most accurate match for an entity, an appropriate sorted list
of ancestor is necessary. This list has to be sorted according the priority of such
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ancestors with the main entity (root of entities tree) as explained in 2.1.
When we have to ﬁnd the most speciﬁc rule in an ACL, it will be necessary to
scan the entities list, element by element, until a valid match is not retrieved with
the ACL list, or the entities list is over. These are the cases in which entities lists has
to be scanned.
There is no linear dependency in building entities trees, since such operation has
been implemented with constant time complexity (or O(1)). This is a very good
result since a heavy nesting among entity relationships, does not introduce additional
complexity. This goal was achieved merely using for each entity a list of pointers which
refer to the entities which it directly belongs to. In other words a list of pointers to
the ﬁrst level ancestors.
During the checking algorithm it is only necessary to follow such pointers itera-
tively. A new pointer is added in an entity list, if such entity holds a new relationship
with another entity.
Therefore time complexity of building entities tree is time constant (O(1)) and al-
located space large as the amount of ﬁrst level ancestors. The only linear dependency
is obtained only when we have to scan it. This complexity is the lowest possible.
Of course, whether in following pointers of a list, a swapped entity is found, we
have ﬁrst to load it in order to retrieve its entities list. In these cases time spent to
scan an entities list will grow.
It is important to say that is useless to use a real tree structure to represent an
entities tree. In fact the only cases in which we have to access to the entities tree are
when we have to ﬁnd a rule for an entity. In these cases we have to check ﬁrst the
principal entity (root), then the ﬁrst level ancestors, then the second ones and so on.
Therefore by using a tree we would check ﬁrst the ﬁrst tree level, then the second one
and so on until the last tree level. This behavior is exactly the same which we can
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obtain by using a classic list. Therefore, whether the word tree is used to refer to
the ancestors structure, this has been implemented as a simple list.
5.3 Add an ACL entry
The procedure shown in section 5.1 has been adopted also when a new ACL entry
has to be added in an ACL list. Before to add a new entry is necessary check if there
is another entry which represents the same entity named in the new rule. Therefore
a list of entries has to be visited. This test case results to be exactly the same shown
in section 5.1.
In this case anyway it would be necessary make some changes in order to im-
prove the performances, since this operation could be more frequently than the one
explained in section 5.1.
For this reason a really good way to represent an ACL table, would be the one in
which the rules are stored in a binary-tree arranged in alphabetic order.
If the number or rules contained in an ACL table is A, then the allocated memory
would have linear complexity O(A). Instead the necessary time to update such table
would have logarithmic complexity, hence O(log A).
Finally, also in this case a hash function could be used, but for the same reasons
expressed in 5.1 this approach is not the best.
5.4 Collection of entity rules
As reported in section 3.4, rules are collected during the entity walk operation.
The algorithm showed in 2.2.1 states that the rule picked from an ACL is the
most speciﬁc for an entity. Therefore if an entity is requesting to perform an action,
we would have to scan its whole entities tree, level by level, in ﬁnding the ﬁrst entity
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which is contained in the ACL table (if there is one).
Therefore cases in which is necessary to scroll these two structures entirely (ACL
table and entities tree both) represents the worst cases.
In this test both lists (also entities trees are lists as it has been said in section 5.2)
are been created with the same number of elements. Moreover, in order to show the
worst case, it has been positioned the only entity which is present in both lists, at
the end of both.
As we can ﬁgure, complexity of this operation is quite quadratic; hence if N is
the number of ancestors of an entity and A the amount of rules contained in an ACL
table, time complexity of this operation is O(N*A).
Figure 16 shows the well-known quadratic shape.
This result could be improved using again a binary-tree. In fact, whereas the
entities list must be scanned linearly element by element, an ACL table can be rep-
resented as a binary-tree (according what has been said in section 5.3). In this way,
for each element contained in the entities tree, the search operation is performed with
complexity O(Log A). Hence for ﬁnding a match for an entity in an ACL table would
be overall O(N * Log A).
5.5 Scan an ACL table
Since ACL rules are stored in entities stack-caches (see section 3.4), entity match-
ing actually is to pick the last value from its cache. Therefore complexity of these
operations is constant (O(1)).
5.6 Scan a delegations list
As showed in section 3.4, delegations are not collected during the walk procedure.
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Figure 16: Ancestors ACL matching algorithm.
Therefore when it is necessary to check the delegations, the same algorithm showed
in section 5.4 is followed. Therefore the same considerations are also valid in this case.
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6 Problem experienced and solutions proposed
In this paragraph some conceptual problems that are been experienced, and their
solutions, are shown.
6.1 ACL deﬁnition
First problem was to deﬁne what exactly ACL has to be and where physically stores
it. An ACL is a set of rules which regulates the accesses to an object and to its
attributes; so an ACL has to be tied to the object it represents.
Problems have been posed were:
• if an ACL is put in a ﬁle which links to the object represented by the ACL; who
establishes the rules to access to the ﬁrst ﬁle?
• If an ACL is put inside the object which it represents; who establishes the rules
to access to the ﬁle part where the ACL is stored?
In the proposed model ACLs are stored among ﬁle attributes as showed in ﬁgure 17.
Moreover such attribute is treated as a special one since no one has to be able to
delete it, and only the ACL co-owners has to be able to change it.
In order to modify an ACL, an entity, writes on the ACL attributes the changes
and only if the request is compliant with the ACL rules it will take eﬀect.
This operations are made automatically by using the command setfacl, as
showed in 3.7.2.
6.2 Delegation deﬁnition
A delegation behaves exactly like a temporary ACL rule; for this reason delegations
could be implemented modifying temporarily an ACL table, and storing there the
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Figure 17: ACL is placed among specials ﬁle attributes.
delegations rules. Even though this procedure is useful; it makes an exception. In
fact, according an ACL, only the co-owners are allowed to modify the rules contained
in it; but anyone who holds at least one valid permission must be able to delegate it.
So if we want to place a delegation among the ACL rules we have to break this rule,
otherwise only the co-owners would be able to issue valid delegations.
Therefore a new ﬁle, called proxies, has been introduced in every entity guard
(ﬁgure 8). Such ﬁle contains the delegation issued by the entity represented by the
guard. This approach does no introduce any exceptions.
Another problem about the delegation mechanism was to decide where store them
once they were valid. For the same reasons showed in section 6.1, the delegations are
stored among the special attributes (see ﬁgure 17).
A new delegation will become valid when the system will approve it. The system
approves a delegation only if the permissions expressed in it, are compliant with the
issuer rights on the ﬁle-system object reported in the delegation.
Unlike from the ACL case, this mechanism is completely hidden from the user
point of view, entities are aware only that in order to create a new delegation they
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Figure 18: Sub-delegation loop.
have to write it in their proxies ﬁle.
If the delegation is not valid no errors are reported, the solely consequence is that
such delegation will not be used in the decision algorithm.
6.3 Sub-delegation
Another question to deﬁne was about the possibility for a delegatee to delegate an-
other entities using its delegations.
Without deﬁne any rule some unpleasant situations may occur. For example,
assuming that there are no limits about the delegations usage; a delegated entity
may use its delegations to sub-delegates another entity which, in turn, it may sub-
delegate the ﬁrst one and go on; making thus the delegation expiration time limitless.
As showed in ﬁgure 18, E1 issues a delegation for E2 which could sub-delegates E3
using an expiration time longer than the one expressed in the original delegation. In
turn E3 could sub-delegates E2 using an expiration time longer than the one expressed
in the previous sub-delegation; and go on.
Therefore some rules have to be deﬁned. Particularly two important aspects of a
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delegation have to be evaluated:
• Sub-delegations lifetime.
• Trust chain depth.
The ﬁrst parameter states how much time a sub-delegation can be considered valid;
whereas the second one states how long the sub-delegation chain can be.
Users can decide to express (or not) the value of the second parameter, which
is left unset by default (hence a limitless length of trust chain). This value merely
represents the maximum number of time which a delegation can be used in order to
delegate other entities, before to be considered no more valid to delegate.
Instead, for what concern the timing question (ﬁrst parameter), an expiration
time has to be mandatory expressed in every delegation. Moreover entities are not
allowed to sub-delegate other entities for an expiration time beyond the one indicated
in the delegation used to issue the new one. This rule is transitive in all the trust
chain. For example, given a chain of delegationa->b->c...k-1->k, b cannot have an
expiration time beyond the one expressed in a, as well as c cannot have an expiration
time beyond the one expressed in d and, clearly, same reasoning up to k. This avoids
delegations endless cases.
6.4 Co-owners
Since that more than one owner is allowed in a ﬁle ACL, may happen that they want
to remove each other from the ACL table. If this would be possible, the object could
remain without anyone able to change its access rules. The ﬁrst followed approach
was to deﬁne a main-owner which cannot be directly removed unless it gave its main-
ownership to another entity. Later it was decided that this way was slightly intricate;
so it has been decided to deny the removal to the last named co-owner in the ACL.
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Note that if an ACL table does not contain the entry nobody (or others) the
co-owners removal does not imply any problems, since the rules of its guard are
automatically inherited. In fact, if an entity wants to modify an object ACL in which
no co-owners are named, according the decision algorithm expressed in 2.2.1, the rules
of the guard are taken in account. Instead if the entry nobody (or others) is present,
it inhibit the rules inheritance. In this last case if neither others nor nobody is able to
manage the object ACL and no co-owners are present in such ACL, no entity will be
able to change the object rules. Hence the ﬁle-system administrator has to intervene
to solve this deadlock.
By assuring that at least one co-owner is alway named in an ACL table, we are
able to avoid all these problems.
6.5 Entities relationships
As it has been said in 2.2.1, entities are able to use their ancestors rights during the
decision algorithm, if no more speciﬁc entry is matched in an object ACL.
This suggests that a protocol which regulates how two entities can stipulate a new
relationship has to be deﬁned.
The following approaches were taken in consideration:
• Let the administrator decide what relationships create.
• Create a new relationship when an entity request it.
• Create a new relationship when both part involved agreed.
The ﬁrst one is the most monitored, but also the most rigid since when an adminis-
trator has deﬁned a relationship, this cannot be modiﬁed by anyone but it. Moreover
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anytime which two users want to create a new relationship they have to ask the per-
mission to the system administrator, which could not be available. Therefore this
solution could introduce a huge wasting of time.
The second one, Even though is the most eﬃcient in terms of execution time,
it is the less secure according the role of the entity which requests to create a new
relationship. Indeed two diﬀerent parts can make such request: the father and the
child. In order to better understand, considering a general relationship entity2 ∈
entity1, we refer as the father entity1 and as the child entity2. If the approach
used foresees that the requester is the child, an entity may recklessly belongs to
every entities it wants to; having so theoretically access to every objects it wants
to. This solution is therefore the less secure. The other case presents the opposite
drawback. If the requester is the father could happen that an entity wants to make
a new relationship with another one, merely to harm it. For example, assuming that
there is an ACL table that states that entity1 are not allowed to read a ﬁle-system
object, and does not say anything about entity2. In this case entity1 may want
to create the new relationship entity2 ∈ entity1 just to harm entity2. In fact,
during the access control, if no rules for entity2 are retrieved, the parents ones are
checked.
Finally the third one is a good trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and security. For these
reason this one has been implemented.
The mechanism in which two entities create a new relationship is expressed in 3.3.
6.6 Not overridable rules behavior
Not overridable rules allow to conﬁgure the system in few steps and to safely control
what users are able to do.
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These rules cannot be operative rules, otherwise it would be impossible to express
rules like: everyone is be able to without implicitly deﬁne everyone can do.
For example, assuming that a rule which allows to everyone who is logged to be
able to be a co-owner (on a given object) has to be deﬁned. As we saw in section 4.2.4
the rule to add is:
others: !cdrwx
This is possible only because this rule is not eﬀective, but it merely represents an
upper-bound limit. If it were a real rule its meaning would be everyone who is
logged is a co-owner.
This model of rules, even though simple to understand, presented a lot of problem.
In fact their priority with the others rules had to be well deﬁned.
A trivial case may be one in which, in the same object, there is a r-rule which
names directly an entity, and an o-rule which names one of its ancestors.
Since an o-rule has priority on the r-rules, but the r-rule is more speciﬁc, what
should be the right rule to follow? Just one (and in these cases which one?), or both
combined?
These situations are solved as showed in 2.2.2. In other words, we search in every
ACL both type of rules separately, by applying the algorithm expressed in 2.2.1.
6.7 Not overridable rules and delegations
Another question concerning the o-rules was about what it would happen if an entity
delegates another one to perform a given action which, according some o-rules, could
not perform. This scenario is quite diﬀerent to the one reported in section 6.6. Indeed
in this case the entity who has requested to perform an operation, would act in behalf
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of another entity which is able to do it. This situation is not trivial.
In order to understand how this can be very tricky, let us see a theoretical example.
Assuming that path a/b/.../f exist, and that the ACLs of the guard a and b
respectively are:
## ACL of a ##
x-entity1: !c-rwx
## ACL of b ##
x-entity1: c-rwx
According these tables x-entity1 is unable to delete objects beyond a, but it is able
to decide who can do it thanks to the co-owner bit. Therefore x-entity1 can write
a new rule in the ACL of b, naming x-entity2 in such way:
## ACL of b ##
x-entity1: c-rwx
x-entity2: -drwx
Besides having rights to delete objects, x-entity2 is now also able to delegate other
entities to do it in its behalf. Particularly x-entity2 can delegate x-entity1, over-
coming the o-rule presents in a.
Even though this does not create inconsistencies, since x-entity1 acts in behalf
of x-entity2 (which is allowed to delete ﬁle-system objects) this has been possible
solely thanks to x-entity1.
In order to avoid all these tricks which could override the o-rules, it has been
decided to give higher priority to the o-rules rather than the delegations.
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6.8 Authentication management
Another question we faced was about the way in which entities can log onto the
system. Ideally each entity could own an object in which writes its credentials to
authenticate itself. Such an object could be placed in the guard which names the
entity, contained in the entities guard.
Moreover, in order to authenticate an entity, the object has to have the write
permission for nobody, since every entity before to be authenticated is unknown from
the server point of view. This fact introduces a huge security issue.
Let us suppose that a x-entity is writing on its login object in order to authen-
ticate itself. Since nobody can write on such object, a malicious entity could write a
sort of null letter at the end of the ﬁle, a moment before which x-entity sends the
request, authenticating itself as x-entity. The system is not able to prevent these
situations since each entity, before to be authenticated, is nobody.
Moreover when an x-entity is authenticated, the object content must be deleted,
otherwise every entity by writing a null letter would be able to authenticate itself
onto the system as x-entity. This is possible merely because nobody has to be able
to write in the login object.
A possible solution for all these problems may be to use a common object for all
the entities, where each entity has to take its lock before start writing its credentials.
In this case only an entity at time takes the access to the object, avoiding all the
problems explained up to now. Unfortunately this approach implies new drawbacks.
Indeed if an entity session crashes, the object is left locked; making impossible to
authenticate other entities. Furthermore a malicious entity may block on purpose
such object just to harm the users which want to authenticate themselves onto the
system.
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The solution adopted plans to use a special ﬁle together with a session buﬀer, in
which the entities write their credentials.
From the user point of view, when it wants to authenticate itself, it has to write
on such ﬁle; but, when this happen, the content is automatically redirected to its
session buﬀer. Such ﬁle is not really present into the ﬁle-system, but is merely an
interface which can be used by the users to authenticate themselves.
In this approach entities are unable to create dead-lock situations and, since actu-
ally they do not write on the same object, all the problems highlighted are avoided.
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Part IV
Comparison with other models
The proposed ACM design takes cue from the other well-known models, particularly
from the ACL POSIX one.
In this section are going to be discussed the diﬀerences between our model and
two other well-known models for the accesses control, which have mostly inspired the
presented one.
Throughout this part, for simplicity of reading, we refer to an entity which contains
other entities as a group, and to a single entity as a user.
7 UNIX standard and ACL POSIX
The traditional UNIX ﬁle-system object permission model deﬁnes three classes of
users: owner, group and others. Each of these classes are associated with a set of
permissions which deﬁne the rules to access to the object. Available permissions are:
read (r), write (w) and execution/traversal (x).
In such model the owner entry represents the object owner permissions, group
represents the owner group permissions (owning group) and ﬁnally others represents
the permissions held by everyone else in the system.
A POSIX ACL table is a collection of rules, which represent a user (or a group)
and its permissions on a ﬁle-system object. Each one of these three classes of users
is represented by an entry in such table; whereas permissions for additional users
(groups), called named users (named groups), occupy additional ACL entries.
A POSIX ACL may contain any number of named users (or named groups) entries,
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which are automatically assigned to the group class.
The meaning of the permissions expressed by the group class is merely to bound
the permission which every entry, assigned to this class, can own. Therefore permis-
sions contained in this class act like a mask : every named entry/group permissions
are masked used the permissions indicated by the group class itself.
This typ of ACL is called access ACL and deﬁnes the current access permissions
of a ﬁle-system object.
A second type of ACL, called default ACL, can be used in order to implement the
inheritance concept. This type of ACL deﬁnes the permissions a ﬁle-system object
inherits from its parent directory at the time of its creation. This type of ACL plays
no direct role in access checks, but it is merely used when a new ﬁle-system object is
created, in order to collect a set of initial rules. Furthermore, only directories can be
associated with a default ACL.
7.1 Comparison with Pepys ACM
The ACM proposed in this document extends the concept of mask (as deﬁned by the
group class in the POSIX ACL) by introducing the o-rule concept. In such way it
is possible to decide whether (and in what ﬁle-system position) to apply a certain
restriction, and for which entity.
Moreover whereas the ﬁle owner in a POSIX ACL cannot be changed (it is who
has created the ﬁle for all the ﬁle lifetime), in our model it is possible to transfer the
ownership merely by adding a new entry which contains the co-owner bit set in the
permission set.
Furthermore, in the presented model, it is possible to let an object dynamically
inherit the rules of its guard, merely by not adding the nobody (and in case oth-
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ers) entry in the object ACL. Therefore if the parent guard rules change, they are
automatically inherited from the guarded objects.
Finally, in the POSIX ACL, the presence of the others entry is mandatory; in our
model it is not.
7.2 Access check algorithms
The algorithms followed by these two models can be divided in two common steps:
1. Select the ACL entry which matches most closely the user who requested the
operation.
2. Check if the matching entry contains suﬃcient permissions to let the user pro-
ceed.
In the POSIX ACL model, in the ﬁrst step, ACL entries are looked in the following
order: owner, named users, named groups, others.
Moreover if a user is a member in more than one group named in a POSIX ACL,
and if some of them contains the necessary permission to grant the requested action,
one is picked (the result is the same regardless of which one is picked). If none of
the matching groups entries contains the requested permission the access would be
denied regardless of which entry is picked. If no entry is found for the requesting user
the others permissions entry determines the access to the object.
In our model, entries in an ACL table are looked in the following order: entities,
others, nobody.
When a user want to perform an action on a ﬁle-system object, if its name is not
directly reported in the object ACL rules, the algorithm picks the entry which has
highest priority (see section 2.1). If there are not any entries which refer (directly or
indirectly) to the user, the rules of the guard above are considered.
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Therefore, the ACL POSIX algorithm tries to ﬁnd an entry which could grant
the access to the requesting user, whereas in our model the most accurate entry is
searched to determinate the access.
Finally in both of these two algorithms, when an entry is picked, a permissions
mask is applied to retrieve the real user permission. However, whereas in POSIX
ACLs such mask is contained in the same ACL table, and ﬁxed by the ﬁle owner; in
our model the mask is determined also by the ACLs of the guards up in the ﬁle-system
hierarchy. Note that in our case masks are given by a collection of o-rules.
8 NTFS
In the NTFS model, the basic permissions which can be assigned to ﬁles are: Full
Control, Modify, Read & Execute, Read, and Write. Whereas, for folder the available
permissions are: Full Control, Modify, Read & Execute, List Folder Contents, Read,
and Write.
Particularly for what concern folders, Read permission make a user able to view
and to list ﬁles and sub-folders contained in it; the Write permission, accordingly,
allow to add ﬁles and sub-folders. Read & Execute permission permits viewing and
listing of ﬁles and sub-folders as well as executing of ﬁles; inherited by ﬁles and folders.
List Folder Content makes a user able to view and to list ﬁles and sub-folders, as well
as executing of ﬁles; this right is inherited by ﬁles and folders. Modify permission
allow to read and to write ﬁles and sub-folders; moreover it allows deletion of the
folder. Finally Full Control allows to read, to write, to change, and to delete ﬁles and
sub-folders .
Instead, for what concern the ﬁles, Read permission allows to a user to read the
ﬁle content, the Write one to write it. Read & Execute permission permits viewing
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and accessing of the ﬁle's contents as well as executing of the ﬁle. Thanks to the
Modify permission a user is able to read, to write and to delete a ﬁle. Finally with
the Full Control permission, a user can read, write, change and delete the ﬁle.
Moreover, in NTFS ﬁle-system, if a user owns full control permission over a folder,
it can delete ﬁles contained in it, regardless of the permission on such ﬁles.
Actions that users can perform are based on the sum of all the permissions assigned
to the user and to all the groups the user belongs to ([29]). For example, if a user
owns the Read access to a given ﬁles, and a group in which it belongs to has the
Modify access on the same ﬁle, the user will have Modify access. This behavior is
inherited, hence if a parent group belongs to the administrator group, the user will
own Full Control permission. If no permissions are retrieved for a requesting user,
the access on a ﬁle-system object is denied.
Since also in this model a user can own a list of permission, the ACL approach is
used.
Another interesting feature is about the usage of two family of rights: Allow and
Deny.
When establishing permissions on a ﬁle-system object, a user has to specify
whether the entry should have access (Allow) or not (Deny) to such object. Since al-
ready the lack of a permission match, for a particular user, is considered as permission
denied, cases in which Deny permissions are necessary are not so common. Finally,
the Allow and Deny permissions inherit down through the ﬁle-system structure.
8.1 Comparison with Pepys ACM
Pepys ACM model presents some little common features with NTFS model.
For example, the idea to use an independent permission to establish if an entity is
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allowed to delete ﬁle-system objects, was taken by studying the NTFS model. Thanks
to this approach is possible, for example, to deﬁne entities which can write deﬁned
ﬁles but which they do not have the faculty to delete them. This is not possible in
ﬁle-systems UNIX-based, because the faculty of delete ﬁle-system object is bound to
the write permission.
In our model the execution permission is not present. This fact does not apply
any limitation to the available operations since the ﬁle-system objects are remotely
stored (Pepys ﬁle-system is a distributed ﬁle-system); hence the execution permission
(alone) would be useless. According to this, if we cut oﬀ the execution among the
NTFS operation, our permissions set and the NTFS one are pretty the same.
Another common feature is the algorithm outcome when no rights, for a given
user, are retrieved. In fact, in both model, the access is denied. Furthermore the
rights inheritance in both models are very similar.
Finally there is just one signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these two model and it is
the way to apply exceptions. Whereas in the NTFS case if a user owns Full Control
permission (on a folder) it is able to delete the whole content, int our model is possible
to add exceptions merely by adding the rules in the object ACL contained in the folder,
or using the Pepys semantic, guarded by the guard.
Our model appears to be more ﬂexible and manageable than the NTFS one.
For example thanks to the Full Control permission, the actions performed by user,
may become uncontrollable. This can be even more dangerous if such permission is
assigned to a group. Instead in our model is possible to add exceptions in any case
for any ﬁle-system objects/users.
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Part V
Conclusions and Future Work
An access-control model for the Pepys Internet-wide distributed ﬁle-system has been
proposed, showing the characteristics of its design. The proposed model takes into
account the basic principles behind the well-known POSIX ACL standard and other
widely used ﬁle-systems, enriching the model with characteristics that are inspired to
the general principles of the Pepys distributed ﬁle-system.
This model aims to cover the main aspects which a distributed ﬁle-system access
control should have, that is: authentication, authorization, granularity, autonomous
delegation and revocation; as properly expressed in [17].
This document provided also a few notes on how the model has been implemented
in a Linux port of the Pepys current code base.
Possible future work on the topic include: integration of Pepys and particularly of
the current authentication mechanism with properly designed cryptographic exten-
sions to the ΠP protocol and possibly optimize the most recurrently used code paths
improving performances.
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